Παρακολουθούμε κάποιες σκέψεις. Και έτσι μια προεπιλογή στο IMF ακολουθεί κάτι παρόμοιο με τον EFSF μετά ένα bunk run και έτσι είμαστε στο σημείο:
"The Greek banks are replacing these lost deposits with emergency funds (ELA) from the Bank of Greece, who is in turn borrowing from the Eurosystem via TARGET2. With these banks increasingly dependent on central bank support, valuations are collapsing as the need for more bailouts becomes clear. This is especially the case if Greece defaults on its bonds which are widely held by Greek banks.
So if the Bank of Greece is borrowing, who is doing the lending? The funds come from the other euro area central banks (via the Eurosystem), particularly the Bundesbank. We can see the increase in this exposure to Greece on Bundesbank's balance sheet. As the Greek citizens are removing funds from their banking system (including taking out bank notes), this balance sheet item at Bundesbank rises further.
In a Grexit scenario, as the Bank of Greece is expelled from the Eurosystem, it will default on its TARGET2 obligations. That in turn will force Bundesbank (and other core euro area central banks) to take a write-down. Of course a nation such as Germany should easily absorb such a loss and recapitalize its central bank. But at that point the Germans will surely want to know just how much more of such exposure their central bank holds.
The answer at this point is that nearly 70% of Bundesbank's assets are in TARGET2 claims - a half a trillion euro exposure to periphery nations' central banks. How much support for the EMU will the Germans have once they realize that a large portion of their central bank's assets could be at risk? After Grexit, the TARGET2 exposure will no longer be some abstract concept - the risk levels will become quite real and German politicians and the media will surely drive that point home". Sober Look
Μένει να δούμε τις αντοχές. Ή όχι;